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1. Introduction
A successful partnership between government and business is essential for the development of
active ageing. An effective policy designed to promote employment opportunities for older
workers needs to serve the interests of both employers and workers. In business practice,
therefore, improvements must be made in the variables that make end-of-career work less hard
and more flexible, adaptable and productive. The following elements are important, given the
weak position of older workers on the labour market: an age-conscious personnel policy,
demotion, the encouragement of part-time work, flexible pay, and training and education.
The Dutch polder model provides a good cultural and institutional basis for facing up to this
challenge (Delsen, 2002a). This chapter discusses the experience in the Netherlands with some
of these issues.
2. A Dutch fourth pension pillar miracle?
The fourth pension pillar involves carrying out productive work, whether at a specially adapted
rate and/or in a specially adapted job. The pension is completely deferred, and income
comprises earnings from (part-time) work for a number of years which are added to the existing
three pension pillars, the cappuccino model. Since older workers can take things easier, they
remain active for longer and much more balanced (Delsen and Reday-Mulvey, 1996; Delsen,
Hutsebaut and Reissert, 1999). Increasing the employment rate of older people does not only
have a denominator effect, because the basis for financing is broadened, but also a numerator
effect, when the number of allowance recipients with a pension, disability, early retirement or
unemployment benefit goes down.
The Netherlands is sometimes called the first part-time economy in the world. If the Nether-
lands is taken as the norm there must be considerable potential in the EU for promoting part-
time work and thus for increasing the activity rate among older people (Delsen 1998). However,
when it comes to the activity rate among older people (aged 55–64), the Netherlands is statisti-
cally an outlier in the European Union (EU) (see Figure 1). In 1995 the employment rate for both
older men and older women was relatively low, despite the fact that the number of older men
and women in part-time work as a proportion of the total number of older men and women in
work was relatively high. In the same year, the proportion of older men in part-time work was
22.8 %, the highest in the EU, while the activity rate was only 39.9%, one of the lowest in the
EU. For older women, the proportion in part-time work was as much as 81.7%, while the
activity rate was only 18.0%. The high proportion of part-time work in the 55–59 age group
can be partly explained by the fact that collective agreements have reduced the working week
for older workers, while for the 60–64 age group the agreements also contain gradual
retirement schemes. Part-time work can shed light on some of the unemployment which is
concealed in the disability and early retirement figures. Part-time work has a preventive effect:
gradual retirement reduces the chance that older workers will become overburdened and offers
them a way of keeping their job. Figures for the Netherlands do indeed show that part-time
early retirement can considerably reduce the disability risk (Aarts and De Jong 1992), which
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means not just considerable savings in disability benefits, but also an increase in the activity rate
among older workers and therefore in the ratio of active to inactive people. It does also imply
that completely healthy workers will want to try to take advantage of the relevant part-time
early retirement scheme, which will increase the total costs of early retirement schemes. But
then again, a net saving of 12.5% will be made in disability benefits. There are also
considerable productivity gains with part-time work, which again broadens the funding basis
for early retirement and pensions, and if full retirement is deferred for a year or more, the
savings will be even greater. Increasing the standard pensionable age, by one year, say, to age
66, would appear to be ultimately feasible. Both the financial and the material conditions must
be created to allow people to stay in work for longer, i.e. for a greater number of years. The
claim that part-time working reduces the supply of labour is a deep-rooted misconception
among economists. The total volume of labour is the product of the number of persons in
work, the number of hours worked and the number of years worked. Expanding the volume of
part-time work offers workers the material conditions to remain in employment and/or to carry
on working for longer. Labour market practice in the Netherlands shows that part-time working
is a necessary condition in order to encourage older people to be active, but is not a sufficient
condition (see Figure 1). The low employment rate of older workers is related to the long
tradition of early retirement. The part-time employment rate among older workers in the
Netherlands is high, while the employment rate is relatively low, due to the existing generous
early retirement options that are available.
Although it is only some five years ago that the employment rate of older workers in the
Netherlands was one of the lowest in the EU, in 2001, as can be seen from Table 1, the
employment rate among older people (55–64 years) has caught up with the EU average. Table 1
also shows that the business cycle i.e. the boom after 1994 is an important explanation for this
Fig. 1: Relationship between activity rates and part-time rates of older workers (55–64 years)
in the European Union in 1995 by gender.
Source: calculated from OECD data
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favourable development. A tight(ening) labour market seems essential for older people to be
active in the labour market. However, it may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition
(Delsen, 2002b).
The Dutch government and the social partners regard increasing the activity rate of older
workers as one of the main socio-economic objectives. The government and the social partners
each have their own responsibilities in this respect. Since the early 1990s it has been
government policy to increase the activity rate among older workers. The government’s input is
to convert the choice between working and not working into a choice between a more gradual
reduction in work and definitive retirement at a later age. The instruments used have included
the conversion of pay-as-you-go early retirement (Vrijwillige Vervroegde Uittreding, VUT)
schemes into funded flexible pension schemes, thus reducing the burden on the younger gener-
ation. The new pension schemes allow to carry on working part-time. Early retirement remains
an option, but people have to pay for this individually. However, the key age is 60 rather than
65, which is the statutory retirement age in the Netherlands. This is, to a certain extent, at odds
with the government policy of promoting the activity rate of older people. In principle, all
persons aged under 60 who are fit to work should have employment. Those aged 60 and over
are considered to retire according to individual preference, making a deliberate cost-benefit
comparison between (carrying on) working, not working or retiring. Other instruments are the
change in the pension base from final pay to average pay, and promoting an age-conscious
personnel policy. The government’s role in all of this has mainly been to lay down conditions.
The number of workers belonging to an average-pay scheme rose from 23 % in 1995 to 32 %
at the beginning of 1999. The number of persons receiving a pay-as-you-go financed early
retirement benefit dropped from 151,800 in 1995 to 113,100 in 2000. In the same period the
number of prepensioners receiving a funded actuarially fair pension increased from 23,100 to
65,800. For the employers this implies less costs and the employees have more choices.
Reversing the incentives in early retirement may be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient
condition for active ageing. Offering workers greater choice and thus greater sovereignty can
result in adverse selection on the labour market. In particular, workers who are well-off and
highly productive are able and willing to opt for early retirement. The less well-off and less
productive workers will choose, or be financially forced, to carry on working for longer, perhaps
even too long. Lower paid will have less opportunity to choose; certainly when the conditions
are increasingly individualised and made actuarially fair. The growth in the number of female
workers and in the number of households with two incomes will increase the demand to stop
1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
NL 29.7 29.0 29.4 30.5 31.7 33.0 35.3 37.9 39.3
EU 38.6 – 36.0 36.6 36.9 37.1 37.9 38.7 39.2
Table 1: Employment rate among older people (age 55–64) 1990–2001.
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Paris, various editions
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work, which will also become possible due to private schemes. Thus, the financial scope to
retire early increases. This may mean that despite the fact that the unemployment and disability
benefit rules and the rules in (company-based) retirement schemes have been tightened up, the
activity rate among older men will not increase by much. Also more complete careers and
higher reference wages offer greater financial scope for early retirement. Public and private
pension schemes act like substitutes. In fact, reduction of public pension provisions may be
overcompensated by private provisions and savings.
3. Age-conscious personnel management
The wages, training and recruitment policies pursued by companies are of crucial importance
for the employability of older workers and thus their employment and earning ability. If policy
changes are to be effective – and make a genuine contribution to the fourth pillar – then
personnel policy will also need to be adapted. An age-conscious personnel policy is designed to
help all workers and aims to prevent relative ageing. To keep older workers motivated and
productive training should not end at a certain age, but should carry on until the end of their
career. More incentives from the government may be needed here. Older workers tend to be
more productive if their duties are adapted or if they change jobs regularly. Practice has shown
that age is a poor criterion for deciding whether or not a worker qualifies for training. Older
people must not be seen as a homogeneous group. There is no such thing as “the elderly”! The
only thing they have in common is that they have reached a certain age. The ageing and
dejuvenation of the labour force in the Netherlands and the effects of internationalisation have
brought older workers into the spotlight in personnel and organisational policy.
In the Netherlands after age 35–40, workers are given less and less attention. They no longer
have job assessment interviews and few opportunities for training. This is what causes the
problem of over-specialisation or “concentration of experience”, partly because the few
changes of function encourage workers to become set in their ways and less alert. This concen-
tration of experience means that the quantity of experience increases but the variety of
experience decreases with age. Work experience is not enough to compensate for the lack of
(further) training. The organisation uses older workers only to carry out very specific tasks, and
this then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Depriving older workers of opportunities to develop
automatically leads to problems of employability, flexibility and productivity. The employability
problems increase with age and often lead to early departure from employment.
Training can play an important part in improving the position of older workers on the labour
market, since it not only keeps knowledge up to standard, but also promotes mobility. Training
reduces the discrepancy between remuneration and productivity. The age-training participation
relation is hump shaped (see Table 2). Older workers take part in training courses less often
than younger workers. The good news is that the attendance at courses has increased in recent
years. The percentage of those aged 50 and over with a job that is involved in training in the
Netherlands is above the EU average, with the Netherlands scoring higher than Germany here.
Education and training can be partly financed from savings in early retirement spending.
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Those who have taken early retirement in the Dutch healthcare sector can take jobs in this
sector from 2001 without incurring a reduction in their early retirement payment or pension.
The PGGM, the pension fund in the healthcare sector, decided on this – in anticipation of
changes to the collective agreement – because of the shortage of manpower. The arrangement
means that those on early retirement could earn up to 180 % of their final pay. The pay-as-you-
go system of financing means that active workers are paying for their re-employed older
colleagues to receive extra, which also helps employers who are unable to find staff. It also
produces steeper pay-age profiles, particularly at the end of the working life.
Practice in the Netherlands shows that wages do increase with age, but the productivity curve
peaks at around age 45. According to the contract theory the wages of younger workers are
below their productivity and those of older workers are above their productivity (See Delsen,
2002b). Wages go up periodically; younger workers subsidise the higher wages of older
workers. In theory this does not have any cost implications for employers, but does generate
commitment from both younger and older workers. Both will work hard, either because they
have a lot to gain from long-term employment with the firm (younger workers), or because
they have a lot to lose if they are made redundant (older workers). This generates higher
productivity and greater loyalty to the company. The implicit contract also helps to overcome
the ‘hold-up’ problem and encourages investment in company-specific human capital1.
However, in future seniority-based pay will increasingly lead to cost problems if the average age
of the workforce increases as a result of ageing and dejuvenation, and if the number of
1 The hold-up problem concerns the relationship between employer and worker in the same company. As a
result of uncertainty about the distribution of any future surplus, both employer and worker defer their
investment, since they expect future wage negotiations on the surplus generated by company-specific
investment to deprive them of part of the profits, because contracts or agreements are incomplete. This
means that less is invested in specific training than is socially desirable.
1993–1994 1995–1996 1997–1998
Age
16–24 29.0 30.7 29.9
25–34 34.8 41.2 43.6
35–44 26.3 33.8 41.2
45–54 18.4 28.0 35.9
55–64 5.0 20.7 23.7
Table 2: Participation of employed people in training courses in the Netherlands,
1993–1998, by age.
Source: OSA (1999) Trendrapport Aanbod van Arbeid 1999, The Hague:
Institute for Labour Studies
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expensive older workers in the workforce expands in relative terms. To keep costs down they
are then made redundant, and if this does not happen because of a shortage of labour, then
profitability drops. This costs jobs in the long run as well. It also explains why Dutch employers
prefer to make older workers redundant first.
4. Outlook
The Dutch government is targeting a permanent increase in the employment rate among older
people – the 55–64 generation – from around 40 % now to over 50 % in 2030. It is a typical
feature of the Dutch ‘polder model’ that the government and the social partners are involved in
the preparation, formulation and implementation of policy (Delsen, 2002a). The Dutch negoti-
ating model (overlegmodel) with its emphasis on seeking a balance between legislation, self-
regulation by the social partners and (tax) incentives from the government seems to provide a
suitable framework to achieve this aim.
In order to encourage employers to take on older workers, from 1 January 2001, the target
group of the scheme of reduced social security contributions for the long-term unemployed
(Vermindering Langdurige Werklozen – VLW) has been broadened for older people. The
employer who retains an older worker is exempt from paying disability (WAO) and unem-
ployment (WW) insurance premiums. From 2002 onwards a number of fiscal measures will be
introduced to keep older workers in employment. The 58-years-old employee receives a tax
credit of 227 EUR, increasing to 681 EUR for those 65 years of age. The fiscal support for early
retirement (VUT) schemes will be abolished in 2002. On the other hand, the planned obligation
of unemployed older workers of 55 years and over, from 1 July 2002 onwards, to look for work
has been postponed.
To discourage the laying off of older workers, the government wants to introduce an own-risk
element in unemployment insurance (WW) for employers who dismiss workers aged 57.5 and
over. This risk would not apply to workers recruited after their 50th birthday. However, the
planned premium differentiation in unemployment insurance will do older workers more harm
than good. Premium differentiation makes it attractive to invest in existing older workers
instead of replacing them with new ones. It encourages internal flexibility. Older workers are
laid off less readily, but unemployed older workers are also taken on less readily. The solution to
the inactivity problem, which in the Netherlands centres on older people and the long-term
unemployed, lies in an active reintegration policy.
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